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The disintegration of Yugoslavia
The process of national liberation of Croatia, Slovenia, and then
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina began with the first free
and multi-party elections in 1990.  The disintegration of
Yugoslavia was a bloody and difficult process, as the Milosevic
regime was not prepared to surrender Serbian hegemony within
the multi-national Yugoslavia.  This process resulted in many relat-
ed wars waged by Milosevic:  the seven-day-war in Slovenia, the
four-year-war in Croatia, a somewhat shorter one in Bosnia
Herzegovina, and finally the NATO intervention in Kosovo in
1999. Former Yugoslavia, that is, Southeast Europe, became the
strategic center of the European periphery (as General Wesley
Clark recently stated)1.
I was a direct witness to these crises, as I served as a volun-
teer soldier during the War of the Homeland from its very begin-
ning in 1991.  As a professor of information science at the
Philosophy Faculty at the University of Zagreb, I worked together
with other colleagues in 1991 and 1992 on the composition and
configuration of the Ministry of Defense and the Croatian Army.
From 1993 on, my task was to organize the Croatian
Intelligence Service (HIS) and Intelligence Community2.  I was the
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director of HIS and the head of the Intelligence Community of the
Republic of Croatia on two occasions:  from 1993-1998 and
from 1999-2000.  Croatia’s Intelligence Service was from the
very beginning a partner of the Western countries - most often
NATO countries - , not only providing support to international
forces on the southeastern territories of Europe, but also an
understanding of the crisis which has, in some ways, repeated
itself during the last ten years: from the independence of Slovenia
and Croatia, to the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the fall of
Milosevic in October, 2000.
Having in mind the large scale engagement of the interna-
tional community, and especially the United States, in the resolu-
tion of this crisis on the territory of former Yugoslavia, I don’t
believe it necessary to list the participants or talk about how the
events developed and were finally brought to their final phases.
But as one of the direct participants in and witnesses to these
events, I would like to share my views and warn that there is a vir-
tual “blockade” to a lasting resolution of the crisis in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as well as in Kosovo. Although I do not wish to gen-
eralize, I nonetheless feel that the same errors are being made in
the international community’s efforts to establish a “new world
order” in other multi-national crises:  Northern Ireland, Chechnya,
the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and so forth.  
Instead of theoretical and academic analyses which attempt
to be “objective”, and taking into consideration what actually
happened – that is, the objective repercussions of certain actions
– I would like to call attention to what did not happen and what
could have happened if the criteria, vision and ways of thinking
had been different.  I would especially like to pose the question as
to why the resolution of the crisis took a direction which has not
led to a lasting resolution?  The presence of 100,000 NATO
troops on the southeast European territory illustrates the fact that
the crisis remains unresolved.
Without diagnosis of the crisis
Why did the crisis last so long and why, in spite of the progress
made, was no lasting resolution achieved?
It is a fact that the international community has at its disposal
reports, data, and information which are increasing daily, but
there is still no resolution to the crisis.  And we cannot expect a
lasting resolution because there is not even a consensus on an
international level on what constitutes the essence of the crisis.
We have information and facts, but lack a knowledge and under-
standing of the core issues.  Most of the actors lacked a basic
understanding of the reasons for the dissolution of Yugoslavia,



























the crisis in Kosovo or in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They are
unable to even predict the repercussions of the Hague Tribunal’s
activities, or to properly regulate their relations with Serbia and
Montenegro.
I am convinced that, first, without an accurate diagnosis
(causes and current status of the crisis), an accurate prognosis
cannot be made (ways and means of resolving the crisis).
Second, the globalization of multi-national crises results in the
imposition by the international community of resolutions which
endanger the parties’ national identity; by doing this, the interna-
tional community only suppresses or postpones, but does not
resolve, the conflict.  (Examples are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
Kosovo, and Northern Ireland, as these parties are in conflict
because they feel their national identity or some vital national
interests are being endangered.) 
It follows from the first thesis that we lack accurate knowledge
about the causes and reasons for the crisis.The second thesis
points to the fact that the international community does not rec-
ognize the rights of the parties in conflict to realize their national
values and interests (as in the case of Kosovo), or else imposes
upon them a political resolution which expresses the interests and
values of the international community, thereby invalidating the
arguments and values of the parties in conflict (for example,
Bosnia and Herzegovina).
I would like to use the following arguments to illustrate my
theses.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, significant changes
took place in Europe:  the dissolution of the Communist system
and the Warsaw Pact; the disintegration of many multi-national
states -  the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia - and
the emergence of new, national states; the end of the Cold War
and the transformation of NATO; and war on the territory of for-
mer Yugoslavia, accompanied by the inaction of European, or,
rather, North Atlantic security mechanisms.
The Communist system the West had fought against for fifty
years collapsed over the summer like a house of cards, but not
due to economic or military breakdowns.  Even today, there is no
commonly accepted interpretation of this collapse3.  The reasons
given for the disintegration of multi-national states are even less
precise and accurate.
What we can say is that at the onset of the crisis, the interna-
tional community did not have a true picture of the state of the
internal relations and conflicts which led to the breakdown of the
Communist system and of multi-national states. This explains why
there were huge differences and misunderstandings within the
international community on how to understand and describe the
situation, and problems in accepting the vision and goals of

























Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo
and Montenegro.  
We can learn a lesson and reach a general conclusion from
this: social and political scientists did not predict the dramatic and
radical changes in Europe at the end of the 1980s and the begin-
ning of the 1990s, which means that their knowledge was inade-
quate and obsolete, since the task of knowledge is to predict cer-
tain scenarios and events. 
Intelligence estimates and resolution of the crisis
My second thesis is that the lack of Intelligence was not the
reason for the non-resolution of individual regional crises.
Intelligence estimates on the state in the region are exchanged by
all partner agencies. I can say with certainty that there are no sig-
nificant differences among the Intelligence services in their evalu-
ations of the crisis, the roles of individual actors in the crisis, and
their motives and goals. The Intelligence services exchange data
and are able to verify the type of data from their own sources, so
there are no major contradictions in the Intelligence estimates
done by Washington, Moscow, London and Ankara on the situa-
tion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia or Kosovo. I say this on
the basis of my own experience, since the Croatian Intelligence
community was a partner in the collection and exchange of not
only data and Intelligence, but also evaluations on the crisis in the
region and possible ways to resolve it.
Nonetheless, certain governments do not make use of the
knowledge of their Intelligence services to effectively resolve
crises.  Why?  Why do Intelligence estimates have no significant
influence on the politicians and their understanding and resolu-
tion of the crisis?  Why don’t certain governments (politicians)
make more use of Intelligence estimates?  This is a practical as
well as a theoretical question: what are the practical, real limita-
tions in the application of our knowledge, that is, Intelligence, in
the resolution of a crisis?
Knowledge and information enable insights into past and
present conditions.  Intelligence enables insights into changes and
imminent events. Intelligence estimates on national crises attempt
to identify actors and their goals.  The goals are determined by
interests, and interests are determined by values.  
By their very nature, regional crises are characterized by con-
flicts between national interests and goals.  I am convinced that
an understanding of a conflict which emerges from a conflict of
interests and goals can be best understood by becoming
acquainted with the values honored by the individual nations, val-
ues from which its interests and goals are derived.
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On the basis of personal experience, I have become con-
vinced that Intelligence estimates on regional crises (regardless of
their accuracy) upset rather than assist governments and interna-
tional organizations.  Why? 
A significant indication of historical development in the twen-
tieth century and especially after the Second World War was the
process of the integration of contemporary civilizations on an eco-
nomic, technological, communicational and cultural level.  Today
our civilization has become functionally integrated.  Globalization
is the ruling ideology of the developed world, and its main values
are human rights, democracy, and the market economy.  
Globalization and human rights
But parallel with this process of integration in the contempo-
rary world is the process of individualization on a national level.
The world is integrated on one side, but on the other, we have a
process of disintegration of multi-national states, and the emer-
gence of new states and new historical entities4.  Latvia, Lithuania,
Estonia, Ukraine, White Russia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina have come into exis-
tence through the process of disintegration.  Perhaps even
Montenegro or Kosovo will emerge in this same way.
Often this process of the creation of new states is described
as an anachronism, as the nationalism of small nations.  It is felt
that these processes of disintegration destabilize the existing world
order because they endanger the balance achieved in European
and world integrations, and they are often not acknowledged as
one of the basic democratic rights of nations to national inde-
pendence, freedom and development.  
The United States of America, as the leading world power, has
a key role in international organizations and NATO, and is there-
fore able to successfully impose upon these organizations its val-
ues and model of behavior.  The United States is the ruling world
power, but the values which ensure America’s national identity
and prosperity are not universal.
American policy was guided by the human rights principle as
determined by President Clinton’s directive5, Executive Order
13107, “Implementation of Human Rights Treaties”, December
10, 1988.  This Executive Order compels all governmental agen-
cies to apply these principles in the implementation of American
foreign policy.
However, American policy only acknowledges individual
human right and treats them as if they were universal human
rights.  Individual human rights form the basic principle upon
which rests the American globalization policy.  Unlike the
























collective human rights: the right to culture, religion, language,
nation, etc.  The Greek-Turkish conflict on Cyprus, Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in Israel, Serbian-Bosnian-Croatian conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the Serb-Albanian conflict in Kosovo
are essentially about collective, not individual human rights.  It is
because of their failure to recognize this difference that the NATO
troops in Kosovo misdirected the goal of their mission, and, there-
fore, KFOR is stuck with no prospects of ending its mission for
many years.
Individual human rights are not necessarily universal; they dif-
fer from culture to culture.  Even “everyday” activities such as
music fall into the category of entertainment in European culture,
but in Indian culture, music is connected to life philosophy.
Privacy and public life have different values in different cultures, as
do politically nuanced issues such as women’s rights, etc.  Basic
political concepts also create confusion, misunderstandings, and
conflicts.  For example, three Bosnian-Herzegovinian parties
accepted the Dayton Agreement under the condition that Bosnia
and Herzegovina be a state consisting of three constitutive
nations; that is, a multi-national state.  In the English language,
the expression multi-national has a different meaning that in
Croatian and other European languages (according to the New
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, multi-national means: compris-
ing or pertaining to several or many nationalities or ethnic
groups6).  Americans speak of multi-ethnic and multi-cultural
Bosnia and Herzegovina without showing any understanding for a
multi-national Bosnia and Herzegovina.  National and ethnic
communities in European law are minorities, and that is exactly
what the Croatians, Serbs and Bosniaks do not wish to be in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This leads to open misunderstandings
because the main political and legal problem has redefined itself
as a cultural and technical problem.  
Each of the three nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina consid-
ers itself constitutive, and each member of these nations consid-
ers himself endangered in the event that his collective rights are
endangered, his right to his language, culture, and religion - not
as an individual but as a member of the Croatian, Serbian or
Bosniak nation.
The international protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
imposing a resolution which is based on the protection of individ-
ual human rights, and this cannot satisfy all three nations.  A flag,
coat of arms, hymn, currency, and passports have been imposed
upon Bosnia and Herzegovina.  People as individuals have
accepted this, since they must travel, shop, and live; but they have
not accepted this as the three nations.  These symbols, therefore,
do not represent collective values, but rather technical solutions


























Globalization and national identity
One of the basic values of small nations is their desire for their
own state, national independence, freedom, and sovereignty.  In
Europe a series of small nations, including Croatia, has achieved
this desire during the past ten years.  The paradox is that the inter-
national community considers the majority of these movements
nationalistic or right wing, and not primarily democratic, liberation
movements. These are young states, and states in transition are
still in the process of constructing state institutions. Just because
they are confronted with problems which developed countries
have already resolved does not mean that the motives, actions,
and goals in these countries are undemocratic or that they are his-
torical anachronisms. It is therefore paradoxical that America and
the international community have often assisted former
Communists and their parties to reassume power, all in the name
of democracy. 
The refusal to acknowledge, validate, or accept collective
human rights – especially those which are critical to national inter-
ests and the goals of some nations – leads to unreal expectations
about actions and operations that have been undertaken.
The military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is one example.
“The fact that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright advised
President Clinton that Mr. Milosevic would fold after a few days of
bombing was a testament to how little she understood Serbian
intransigence”7. After the removal of Milosevic and the election of
Kostunica as President of Yugoslavia, the international communi-
ty is again just as prepared to make false evaluations and hasty
conclusions.  Another example is Special Envoy to the UN
Secretary General Carl Bildt’s recent “non-paper”8, which pro-
motes stability in the “Balkans”, but by first placing these countries
in quarantine, then integrating them by the formula 5 plus 1 plus
1, and only allowing them the right to satisfy the minimum of
national interests.  
Carl Bildt does not see these countries as equal partners, or
as partners in European integration; they are simply countries with
“low-level sovereignty”, in the “waiting room” for integration with
the democratic world.  Bildt’s proposal does not respect the views,
interests, and values of countries in the region; it simply imposes
resolutions. This entire conflict broke out because individual
nations revolted against the hegemonistic dictates of the stronger
powers.
A recent statement by George Bush, Jr., who said that
American foreign policy should stop being so arrogant and stop
imposing its political and cultural values on other countries is
therefore reassuring.  I quote: “I just don’t think it’s the role of the115
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United States to walk into a country and say, we do it this way, so
should you..I think the United States must be humble and must be
proud and confident of our values, but humble in how we treat
nations that are figuring out how to chart their own course9.”
Not all problems come from one direction.  We know that
problems appear in a different light if measured against other cri-
teria or seen through other mirrors.  Croatia is a small country in
Southeastern Europe. For various historical and political reasons,
it is very sensitive about its independence, freedom, and sover-
eignty, and will therefore expend all its energy in preserving its
national identity and prosperity.  Croatia sees its future in
European and North-Atlantic integration and organizations.
Croatia is not interested in participating in this integration on the
basis of Balkan associations.  Croatia wishes to have good rela-
tions with its neighbors, but wants to be an equal partner and
member of the international community.
The process of globalization has enabled the national inde-
pendence of small nations emerging from multi-national commu-
nities.  The democratization of Europe would not have been pos-
sible without ensuring the rights of all European nations to self-
determination.
Small nations who now have their own states have become
subjects on the international scene and have a chance to achieve
freedom, self-sufficiency, and development in cooperation with
other nations of the world.  The process of integration of the for-
mer Communist countries and new sovereign states in European
and North-Atlantic organizations is unavoidable.  The process of
democratization and modernization of transition countries will be
painful, for these countries must pay a high price if they wish to
attain the high standards which exist in Europe. But this process
can also be wraught with misunderstandings and unnecessary
conflicts if the international community does not “democratize” at
the same time; that is, if it does not envision integration as a two-
part process in which, on the one hand, new states will fulfill the
high standards of the international community, but, on the other,
their national identities, security and prosperity are guaranteed.
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